THE CHANGING OBLIGATIONS OF TRIAL COURT AND ATTORNEY OBLIGATIONS IN THE WAKE OF PADILLA

By: Brienna Christiano, Albany Government Law Review

In recent history, there has been a significant upheaval in the understanding of what criminal defense attorneys and trial courts are obligated to tell criminal defendants regarding the deportation consequences of the accepted plea agreement.[1] Recent Supreme Court cases have created a complex line of cases that led to the overruling of a landmark New York Court of Appeals case, People v. Ford, 86 N.Y. 2d 397 (1995).[2] These decisions have created a new procedure for criminal defense attorneys and trial courts prior to a criminal defendant’s acceptance of a plea deal.[3]

In 2010, the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, a groundbreaking case holding that a criminal defendant who is not informed by his attorney of the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction prior to accepting a plea deal has a viable ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment.[4] Prior to the Padilla decision, most state and federal courts did not require attorneys to inform their clients of the consequences of their convictions.[5] In Padilla, the defendant, a native Honduran and Vietnam veteran, had been a “lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than forty years.”[6] Padilla pled guilty to the transportation of marijuana.[7] He claims that prior to entering the plea, his counsel not only failed to inform him of the consequences of a criminal conviction, but also erroneously told him that because he had been a resident of the United States for so long, he “did not have to worry about immigration status.”[8] Padilla then accepted the plea, which subsequently led to deportation proceedings being brought against him.[9]

The Court applied the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington for ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and determined that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.[10] The Court reasoned that it should be relatively simple for attorneys to look through the relevant deportation statute to decide if their client’s conviction could lead to immigration consequences down the road.[11] As opposed to complicated immigration law, the statute outlining behaviors that lead aliens to be deported from the United States is more simplistic and accessible.[12]

In 2013, the Supreme Court decided Chaidez v. U.S., 133 S.Ct. 1103 (2013),[13] which affects the application of Padilla to defendants whose convictions were final prior to 2010. In that case, the Court explicitly stated that the Padilla holding does not apply retroactively to a person whose conviction was final prior to the date of the Padilla decision in 2010.[14] The appellant in Chaidez was similarly uninformed that her conviction would subject her to removal from the United States; Chaidez’s conviction became final in 2004.[15] The Court declined to apply Padilla retroactively based on its previous holding in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which held that “retroactivity of our criminal procedure decisions turn on whether they are novel.”[16] Padilla changed the law for most jurisdictions by imposing new obligations on attorneys. However, because the Court considered the holding to be a new rule it refused to apply it retroactively.[17]

The Padilla holding had a major impact on New York State’s position in this area. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla, People v. Ford was the controlling case in New York concerning whether an attorney had the duty to inform his client of the deportation consequences before his client accepts a plea deal.[18] In Ford, the defendant was showing a gun to his girlfriend and, believing the gun to be unloaded, pulled the trigger and instantly killed her.[19]

Following counsel’s advice, Ford pled guilty to manslaughter in the second degree.[20] Since Ford was a legally documented alien from Jamaica convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, deportation proceedings were commenced against him shortly thereafter.[21] The court held that counsel’s failure to warn Ford of the possibility of deportation did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.[22] Applying the Strickland standard, the court reasoned that because Ford’s counsel did not misadvise him, but instead just omitted to mention any deportation consequences, the Strickland standard was not met.[23]

Furthermore, the court concluded that the trial court only has to inform the defendant of the direct consequences of his plea prior to its entry.[24] The court generally does not have an obligation to inform the defendant of the collateral consequences of his plea.[25] Deportation was deemed by the court to be a collateral consequence of a conviction because “it is a result peculiar to the individual’s personal circumstances and one not within the control of the court system.”[26] Therefore, because the risk of deportation would be a unique concern to that particular defendant, the trial court was not obligated to inform him of the potentially life-changing impact that his conviction could have.

The Ford decision is clearly at odds with the Supreme Court’s holding in Padilla. The Court took up this issue in People v. Peque,.[27] The issue in the case was almost identical to that in Padilla, but the court considered whether a trial court must inform a criminal defendant of the deportation consequences of a criminal conviction prior to the acceptance of a plea or whether the duty rested solely on the defendant’s attorney.[28] The court held that “deportation constitutes such a substantial and unique consequence of a plea that it must be mentioned by the trial court to a defendant as a matter of fundamental fairness.”[29]

Thus, although the court was split on the issue of whether deportation could be considered a direct or collateral consequence of a guilty plea, the court held that regardless, the risk of deportation is severe enough to warrant its discussion prior to the entry of a plea.[30] The court then partially overruled part of its prior holding in Ford. In particular, Peque overruled the part of Ford holding that a trial court’s omission of any discussion of deportation at the plea proceeding does not render the defendant’s plea involuntary.[31] Thus, trial courts now have the duty to tell defendants that, if they are not United States citizens, their felony guilty pleas may expose them to deportation proceedings.[32]

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Padilla has caused significant changes to the rights of non-citizen defendants. After Padilla, non-citizen defendants who are not warned by their counsel of the deportation consequences of the plea deal have a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment.[33] Thus, Padilla has put a duty on attorneys to warn their clients of the possibility of immigration consequences stemming from a criminal conviction.[34] However, the recent Supreme Court holding in Chaidez informs that the Padilla holding only applies to individuals whose convictions were finalized after the Padilla decision was handed down in 2010. Criminal defendants wishing to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Padilla holding must have a finalized conviction after 2010.[35] The New York Court of Appeals built off the Padilla decision in Peque by mandating that trial courts have the duty to inform all defendants of the possibility of deportation prior to entering into a plea deal.[36]

The Court of Appeals was undoubtedly influenced by the significant and harsh impact that deportation has on non-citizen defendants. The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) reports that “ICE conducted 133,551 removals of individuals apprehended in the interior of the United States.”[37] Additionally, “eighty-two percent of all interior removals had been previously convicted of a crime.”[38] An ICE spokesperson said: “ICE has been vocal about the shift in our immigration enforcement strategy to focus on convicted criminals, public safety and border security and our removal numbers illustrate this[.]”[39] With deportation rates at such staggering heights, it is imperative that criminal defendants are warned of the severe consequences of their acceptance of pleas.

[1] Vincent Bonventre, Supreme Court: Highlights … (Part 7—More Criminal Law Decisions), New York Court Watcher, January 3, 2011.

[2] Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010) (holding that counsel must inform his clients who are criminal defendants of the immigration consequences of his conviction); Chaidez v. U.S., 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1105 (2013) (holding that Padilla does not have retroactive effect); People v. Ford, 86 N.Y. 2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).

[3] Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366.

[4] Id at 365.

[5] Kevin Johnson, Court Refuses to Apply Padilla v. Kentucky retroactively, SCOTUS Blog, Feb. 21, 2013, http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/opinion-recap-court-refuses-to-apply-padilla-v-kentucky-retroactively/.

[6] Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359.

[7] Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359; 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (This statute lays out the types of crimes that warrant the deportation of aliens. Among the crimes that begin deportation proceedings include: crimes of moral turpitude, aggravated felony, high speed flight, failure to register as a sex offender, virtually any drug offense: whether it was a federal or state violation, drug addiction, and certain firearm offenses.).

[8] Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010) (quoting 253 S.W. 3d 482, 483 (K.Y. 2008)).

[9] Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359.

[10] Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366–67; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)) (The Court set the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims: “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient . . . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial[.]”).

[11] Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.

[12] 8 U.S.C. § 122; Padilla, 559 U.S. at 385.

[13] Chaidez v. U.S., 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1105 (2013).

[14] Id.

[15] Id. at 1106.

[16] Id. at 1107; Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (“[W]e now adopt Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity for cases on collateral review. Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.”).

[17] Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. at 1110.

[18] People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 401 (N.Y. 1995), overruled by People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d 168, 176 (N.Y. 2013).

[19] Ford, 86 N.Y.2d at 402.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] Id. at 404.

[23] Id. at 405.

[24] People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 403 (N.Y. 1995), overruled by People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d 168 (N.Y. 2013).

[25] Id. (Some examples the court gives of collateral consequences are the loss of the right to vote, travel abroad, possess firearms, or civil service employment.).

[26] Id.

[27] People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d 168, 175 (N.Y. 2013).

[28] Id. at 175.

[29] Id. at 194.

[30] Id. at 189, 192–93, 196, 204, 207*12–13 (“[A] convicted non-citizen defendant’s actual removal from the country exacts the greatest toll on the defendant and his or her family . . . [T]he defendant loses the precious rights and opportunities available to all resident of the United States.”).

[31] Id. at 195–96.

[32] Id. at 197.

[33] Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364–66 (2010).

[34] Id. at 374.

[35] Chaidez v. U.S., 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1105 (2013).

[36] People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d 168, 197.

[37] FY 2013 ICE Immigration Removals, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security: ICE, (Jan. 25, 2014, 12:53 PM (last visited August 22, 2014), http://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/. (alterations in original).

[38] Id.

[39] Stephen Dinan, Report: Deportations Plummet in 2013, Lowest Since 2007, Wash. Times, Oct. 30, 2013. (alterations in original).

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DEC: Clean Your Boat!

By: Jeffrey Pritchard, Albany Government Law Review

On January 9, 2014, New York State’s Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) released the text of a proposed rule which aims to fine boaters for the failure to clean and drain a boat prior to entering a New York body of water.[1] This regulation is aimed at curbing the spread of invasive species, which have been located in bodies of water throughout New York State, resulting in damaging effects for native aquatic life. With this proposed rule, the DEC is hoping the possibility of a $250 fine will ensure boaters take proper care of their watercrafts, and prevent further proliferation of invasive species in New York water bodies.[2]

A Tale of Two Invasive Species

The spread of an invasive species such as Hydrilla verticillata (hydrilla) is why the DEC is concerned with proper boat sanitation.[3] Hydrilla is an aquatic plant which appears harmless to the eye, but can have devastating impacts on a water body’s ecosystem. Hydrilla resembles seaweed and can grow to be twenty or thirty feet long.[4] Once hydrilla is in a body of water, it can grow up to an inch in length per day; a fast-paced spread which can prove fatal to native plants in a body of water, since hydrilla blocks sunlight native plants need to survive.[5] Hydrilla can also harm fish by reducing oxygen levels in the water.[6] Hydrilla is widespread in Long Island, and was first located upstate in Cayuga Lake in Ithaca, New York in 2011.[7] Hydrilla has since been discovered in the west end of the Erie Canal in 2012.[8] Considering the distance of Cayuga Lake from the west end of the Erie Canal, this spread was likely the result of a hydrilla stem hitching a ride on a dirty boat from Cayuga Lake to the Canal.

A more widespread invasive species, Dreissena polymorpha (zebra mussel), is also the target of the DEC’s proposed regulation.[9] The zebra mussel is a small organism which attaches easily to boats and other solid surfaces.[10] The zebra mussel’s propensity to stick to boats is not the only troublesome aspect of their ability to attach to surfaces. As a result the zebra mussel’s rapid reproduction, if one latches on to a public water supply pipe it could quickly render that pipe clogged with zebra mussels, resulting in millions of dollars spent by local governments to remove the blockage.[11] The zebra mussel has been found in water bodies throughout New York State,[12] with its spread being undoubtedly assisted by attaching to dirty boats.

Overview of Federal Invasive Species Regulation

Regulation of the methods of travel of invasive species is not a novel concept, as these species were once the target of federal legislation. Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990,[13] and its successor, National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA),[14] passed in response to the spread of aquatic invasive species in the United States. Zebra mussels were specifically mentioned by name in these pieces of legislation.[15] In NISA, Congress targeted the introduction of invasive species specifically through ballast water tanks.[16] Ballast water tanks store water that a large boat takes on at the port of departure, and discharges at its destination.[17]

By its very nature, ballast water is a prime vehicle for invasive species transportation.[18]   The fact that 10,000 marine species are estimated to be transported by ballast water tanks daily indicates ballast water requires regulation to control the spread of invasive species.[19] NISA provided regulation over ballast water by creating a National Ballast Water Information Database and providing demonstrations on the proper use of existing technologies to treat ballast water to remove invasive species;[20] however, funding for NISA expired in 2002, and Congress has not since renewed funding for limiting the spread of invasive species.[21]

Ballast water dumping was not regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) after NISA’s expiration, as the EPA had exempted ballast water from the Clean Water Act’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting system.[22] The Clean Water Act requires a discharger of any pollutant into the navigable waters of the United States to receive a NPDES permit.[23] In the years after NISA’s expiration, however, New York State joined as a plaintiff in a challenge to the EPA’s ballast water exemption in Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. EPA.[24] In this case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that it was Congress’s intent for the EPA to regulate ballast water under the Clean Water Act, as ballast water fits the definition of a pollutant.[25] After this ruling, ballast water may not be discharged without an NPDES permit.[26]

The “Clean Your Boat” Rule

The DEC’s new proposed regulation adds to the EPA’s ballast water regulations by using the police power of New York State. The police power is the power of a state to regulate people and property in order to promote the public health and safety.[27] As an arm of the state, the DEC uses this power in order to protect and enhance the environment.[28] The DEC specifically has the authority to manage aquatic wildlife,[29] weeds,[30] and boat launches.[31] This legislative grant of power to the DEC provides the statutory framework for this “Clean Your Boat” rule.

The “Clean Your Boat” rule states that no “watercraft [may be launched in New York] with any plant or animal, or parts thereof, visible to the human eye, in, on, or attached to any part of the watercraft.”[32] Therefore a boat with even one small zebra mussel or hydrilla stem would be subject to a fine, and boaters would need to undergo a thorough cleaning of their craft in order to comply with the regulation by ensuring no invasive species is hitching a ride on the craft. This is a burden on boaters, but, if this regulation is to be effective in stopping the spread of invasive species, banning the transport of any amount of such species is necessary.

The proposed rule defines watercraft as “every motorized or non-motorized boat or vehicle capable of being used or operated as a means of transportation or recreation in or on water,”[33] meaning this rule would apply to canoes, rafts, or even a recreational water tube. Although it seems extreme to subject even a small tube to this regulation, invasive species can travel on non-motorized watercrafts just as well as on motorized ones; therefore, applying this rule to all watercrafts makes it more likely to be effective in controlling the spread of invasive species.

DEC wildlife authorities have the power to search a boat without warrant if there is a suspected violation of fish and wildlife regulations.[34] These DEC agents also have the power to issue fines to a boater not compliant with regulations.[35] This provides the statutory authority for the $250 fine levied for violations of this proposed rule.

Although the DEC states in the notice of the proposed rule that this regulation will have no financial cost to the agency,[36] the DEC does pay the wildlife authorities tasked with inspecting the boats and imposing fines, therefore there is some cost to enforcement of the rule in its current state. As discussed below, any attempts to strengthen the rule would also add additional costs to New York State.

Criticisms and Recommendations

The Lake George area was ahead of the rest of New York State in putting in place invasive species inspections.[37] As of May 2014, all boats launched into Lake George are subject to mandatory inspections to ensure there are no invasive species carried on the boat.[38] The inspections in Lake George are paid half by New York State, and half by a partnership of municipalities and businesses situated around the lake.[39]   There is no cost for the inspections, and a boat is cleaned free of charge if it is found carrying an invasive species.[40] In order to get the word out about the new mandatory inspections, the Lake George partnership sponsored a public information campaign with a website entitled “Lake George Boat Inspections”.[41]

A criticism of the “Clean Your Boat” rule advanced by the Times Union is, because the statewide rule lacks mandatory boat inspections, the rule is voluntary and will not be effective.[42] Instead, the argument suggests, there should be mandatory statewide inspection of boats entering the water, similar to the system in place for Lake George.[43] As noted, however, the Lake George area had the funding available to staff inspection sites. Other municipalities across the state which have bodies of water may not have such funding available, especially with many upstate communities struggling economically. The proposal from the Times Union to implement a statewide inspection system modeled after Lake George would likely require a significant financial contribution from New York State. A less expensive alternative would be to use Lake George as a model for getting the word out to the boating public about their new obligations under this rule.

Because ensuring a boat is properly cleaned would be every boater’s legal duty under this regulation, the DEC should clearly communicate to boaters what their obligations are under this regulation. In addition to an information campaign modeled after the Lake George program, the DEC could provide cleaning demonstrations similar to those authorized under the National Invasive Species Act of 1996.[44] In these demonstrations, the DEC could provide demonstrations of cleaning techniques for ballast tanks and boats, as well as examples of boats that would be subject to the fine, and boats that are clean enough to pass an inspection under the new regulation. The aforementioned federal law NISA appropriated $2.5 million dollars for its Ballast Water Management Demonstration Program.[45] The DEC would not need to spend this much money on an educational program, however, they would incur some cost, similar to the informational campaigns for Lake George. The cost of such education programs may be covered by the revenue brought in by fines for non-compliant water crafts, it is important to note that by law the fines levied under this regulation will be paid to the general fund of New York State, not going directly to the DEC.[46]

If the DEC communicates more to boaters about their new obligations under this regulation, this rule could play an important part in controlling the spread of invasive species in New York. Although invasive species such as zebra mussel have already made their way to water bodies throughout New York State, there is still time to stop their further spread, as well as the spread of other less-prevalent species such as hydrilla. The adoption of this regulation, while imposing an additional burden on boaters in New York waters, is a positive step in the fight against the spread of invasive species.

 

 

[1] New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, DEC Proposes Regulatory Changes to Prevent the Introduction of Aquatic Invasive Species at Boat Launches (2014), http://www.dec.ny.gov/press/95172.html (emphasis added).

[2] Id.

[3] New York Invasive Species Information, Cornell Cooperative Extension Invasive Species Program, (Oct. 2012), http://www.nyis.info/index.php?action=invasive_detail&id=16.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, Proposes Regulatory Changes to Prevent the Introduction of Aquatic Invasive Species at Boat Launches (2014), http://www.dec.ny.gov/press/95172.html.

[10] U.S. Geological Survey, Zebra Mussel FAQs, (Sept. 3, 2013), http://fl.biology.usgs.gov/Nonindigenous_Species/Zebra_mussel_FAQs/zebra_mussel_faqs.html.

[11] Id.

[12] New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, Common Aquatic Invasive Species of NY (2013), http://www.dec.ny.gov/animals/50272.html.

[13] Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–646, 104 Stat. 4761.

[14] National Invasive Species Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–332, 110 Stat. 4083.

[15] Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act, supra note 13.

[16] Id.

[17] Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2008).

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] National Invasive Species Act, supra note 14, at Sec. 1102, 1104(b)(1), 110 Stat. 4073-4.

[21] Id. at 110 Stat. 4090.

[22] 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a) (2013) (exempting from NPDES permitting the discharge of water in the “normal operations of a vessel” The EPA argued that ballast water release was in the normal operation of boats, therefore, ballast water release was not subject to the NPDES permitting system.).

[23] 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).

[24] Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008).

[25] Id. at 537 F.3d 1020–22.

[26] Final National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System General Permit for Discharges Incidental to the Normal Operation of a Vessel, 73 Fed. Reg. 79473 (Dec. 29, 2008).

[27] Joseph F. Zimmerman, The Government and Politics of New York State 1–2 (2d ed) (2008).

[28] See State of New York Management Resources Project, Governing the Empire State 9 (1988).

[29] N.Y. Envtl. Conservation Law § 3-0301(1)(c) (McKinney 2014).

[30] Id. at § 3-0301(1)(k).

[31] Id. at § 11-2101(1)(a).

[32] State Boat-Launching Sites, Fishing-Access Sites and Fishing Rights Areas, Department of Environmental Conservation Proposed Rule (to be codified at 6 NYCRR 59), http://www.dec.ny.gov/regulations/95111.html.

[33] Id.

[34] N.Y. Envtl. Conservation Law § 71-0907(4)(b) (McKinney 2014).

[35] Id. at § 71-0923(1).

[36] State Boat-Launching Sites, Fishing-Access Sites and Fishing Rights Areas, Regulatory Impact Statement, Department of Environmental Conversation (to be codified at 6 NYCRR 59), http://www.dec.ny.gov/regulations/95116.html.

[37] Lake George Park Commission, Lake George Boat Inspections, http://www.lgboatinspections.com/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2014).

[38] Id.

[39] Id.

[40] Id.

[41] Id.

[42] Editorial, A Naïve Plan For Invasives, Times Union, Jan. 16, 2014, http://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/Editorial-A-naive-plan-for-invasives-5150183.php.

[43] Id.

[44] National Invasive Species Act, Pub. L. No. 104–332, 110 Stat. 4073, 4084 (1996).

[45] Id. at 110 Stat. 4091.

[46] N.Y. Envtl. Conservation Law § 71-0507(4) (McKinney 2014) (directing all fines levied under the Environmental Conservation Law be paid to the New York general fund).

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Allowing Employers to Make Tangible Employment Decisions Based on an Employee’s Use of Tobacco

By Cameron Betterley, Albany Government Law Review

I. A Widespread Problem

            The devastating health effects of tobacco use are well documented and widely known. Tobacco use is the number one cause of preventable death in the United States,[1] resulting in 480,000 deaths annually, or approximately one of every five deaths each year.[2]  Twenty-five thousand of those deaths occur in the State of New York.[3]  Indeed, “more deaths are caused each year by tobacco use than by all deaths from [h]uman immunodeficiency virus (HIV), [i]llegal drug use, [a]lcohol use, [m]otor vehicle injuries, [f]irearm-related incidents.”[4]  The adverse health effects are not limited to smokers, as exposure to secondhand smoke causes approximately 42,000 deaths per year in the United States[5]—2,500 of those who die are New Yorkers.[6]  Moreover, while extraordinary progress has been made in the last fifty year—“reductions in smoking prevalence avoided an estimated 3 million deaths between 1964 and 2000”—efforts have been less successful with the poor and the less educated.[7]  In 2006, for example, 30% of the least educated were smokers, while only 9% of the most educated were.[8]

II. No Right to Smoke

            Federal law does not protect tobacco users or entitle them to equal protection in all aspects of employment, including hiring, firing, and promotions.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, for example, does not recognize tobacco users as a protected class.[9]  However, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia currently offer employment protections to tobacco users[10] through laws “that expressly prohibit employers from taking adverse employment actions on an employee’s off-duty legal conduct such as smoking[.]”[11]

            New York, which is among these states, actually goes further, prohibiting an employer from firing or from refusing to hire or employ an employee due to his or her legal use of any consumable products outside of work.  This article argues that New York law should be amended to allow employers in New York to fire, or to refuse to hire, employees or potential employees who smoke or otherwise consume tobacco.

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Levels of Departmental Compliance Related to Timeliness of Fair Hearings Under the Federal Food Stamp Act of 1964

By Dustin Bennett, Albany Government Law Review

 

I.            Introduction

            Statutes are created to set the law on a given topic that the government wishes to control, and are created for individuals as well as for governmental agencies to follow. In pursuit of enforcing these statutes, different agencies within the Executive Branch set regulations creating guidelines for the proposed class or classes to follow. State agencies and departments fall into one of the classes that may be required to follow these promulgated regulations.

            The Federal Food Stamp program,[1] which is an important part of federal benefits law, is one of these statutes. The department that deals with this law the most is the Department of Social Services (DSS), known under different titles depending on the state and administered at the county (or other jurisdictional) level. Regulations that departments such as DSS regularly face, to comply with these laws, are regulations regarding timeliness of benefits and hearing appeals.[2]  The departments deal with so many individual cases that some cases inevitably fall through the cracks. However, according to the regulation, all cases must be dealt with within a specified period of time.[3]  This has caused a dilemma for state departments. In determining the level to which an agency must comply with the regulation, case law has been created causing a circuit split on which level is sufficient. Most courts that have ruled on this issue have held that the departments must “strictly comply” with the federal regulation,[4] meaning every case has to be dealt with within that regulation-created period of time. One circuit has ruled in favor of only requiring “substantial compliance,”[5] but this compliance level has yet to be completely defined and implemented.

            This article will give a brief overview of the case law regarding which level of compliance is currently required within the circuits, and why there may be such a back-and-forth concerning which level is the correct level. In conclusion, this article will explain why substantial compliance should be the preferred compliance level.

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